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‘Lucretius and (early) modernity’ is not an entirely novel combination or juxtaposition. This 
reviewer participated in a conference in Milan almost ten years ago that bore the name … Lucrezio 
e la modernità; Catherine Wilson, a contributor to the volume under review, published a book 
around the same time entitled Epicureanism at the origins of  modernity.
1
 Several important edited 
volumes on the reception of Epicureanism have appeared since then, some with a more exclusively 
scholarly focus,
2
  some more receptive to the inflections of ‘Theory’. The latter trend is not 
monolithic either, since some projects bear the mark of the late Althusser’s idiosyncratic re-
imagining of a Lucretian ‘aleatory materialism’,3 while others locate themselves in the territory of 
Deleuze’s or Michel Serres’s revival of Lucretius,4 the latter being perhaps the first of a series of 
studies fixated on the clinamen, culminating with S. Greenblatt’s The Swerve.5 These interpretive 
trends are touched on in David Norbrook’s elegant introduction to this volume. 
The present volume is less concerned with subterranean, counter-histories of philosophy (or 
politics, or literature); it focuses on De rerum natura (hereafter DRN)’s ‘language and material 
circulation, as a means of refining generalizations about Epicurean philosophy’ (2), on ‘the specific 
material and cultural contexts in which the DRN was interpreted’ in early modern culture (12). 
Norbrook notes that ‘recent scholarship on medieval and early modern manuscripts has urged a 
renewed attention to their material properties, a movement often linked with a postmodern 
celebration of plurality rather than a search for a fixed authorial original’ (4). But methodologically 
it is more conservative, deliberately targeting volumes like Greenblatt’s Swerve and voicing 
suspicion (notably in Hardy’s chapter) as to the fashion of ‘contingency’ in Lucretian readings.6 
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 A partial exception is Williams’s chapter on Montaigne – chock-full of careful study of the textual layers of 
Montaigne’s embedded and encrypted reading of DRN – with its nod to distributed cognition. 
We learn a great deal here about the influence Cicero and Virgil had on early modern (and our) 
readings of Lucretius, bearing in mind the great prestige of the Aeneid in medieval and early 
modern times. Norbook notes in his introduction that ‘early modern humanists were excited to 
recover a poem which Virgil had valued so highly, and indeed against which he had been prompted 
to react in such complex ways’ (6). Montaigne read Lucretius and Virgil together, also noting the 
former's influence on the latter. Seneca, too, valued Lucretius highly – even if he warned against 
falling into the ‘boundless chaos’ of Epicurus7 –  but the negative views of Epicureanism found in 
Cicero’s De natura deorum and Plutarch’s In Colotem were influential. Thus Hardy notes that Post-
Aristotelian natural philosophers often combined a theological argument about the providential 
ordering of the world with an ‘abhorrence of Epicureanism as the negation of natural and moral 
orders’, drawing on Cicero and Lactantius’s critiques. As in the English literary tradition, however, 
this hostile treatment of Epicureanism seems not to have involved close engagement with 
Lucretius’s poem, which might have served as an accomplice for natural theology rather than a foil 
(Hardy, 216). Early moderns used Cicero et al.’s anti-atomism, and portrayed Lucretius in those 
terms, so that many instances cited as early modern responses to Lucretius or Epicureanism are 
closer to Roman parodies such as Cicero’s than to the Epicurean sources themselves (Hardy, 208); 
this includes Bacon, whose critique of atomism conspicuously leaves out Lucretius and relies more 
on the occasionally caricatural presentations in Cicero and the Church Fathers (210).  
In addition, historians of philosophy will be curious to learn that in Roman antiquity there is little 
evidence that the poem achieved philosophical success; instead, its main influence, evidenced most 
notably by the Augustan poets Virgil and Horace, was literary (Butterfield, 45). I did not know until 
reading this volume that Lucretius was not read in the Middle Ages (5, discussed in Butterfield’s 
chapter 2). Butterfield states in his chapter that there is no convincing evidence ‘that anyone in 
Europe between the tenth century and the second decade of the fifteenth century read Lucretius 
directly’ (47). Curiously, ‘not only was Lucretius not placed on the Index, but the Jesuits developed 
strategies for teaching parts of the DRN, recognizing its importance for any understanding of 
classical poetry and thought’ (Norbrook, 17). 
We also learn a vast amount of non-trivial information about Lucretius’s early modern translations 
and indeed the translators themselves (first Michel de Marolles in French, then John Evelyn, Lucy 
Hutchinson and Thomas Creech in English, discussed in particular in Cottegnies’ and Butterfield’s 
chapters). Aphra Behn praised Creech’s translation of DRN as a contribution to the cause of 
women’s rights (Norbrook, 22), although Hutchinson, a woman translator of the DRN, ended up 
fiercely attacking Lucretius, in reaction to libertine Restoration Epicureans, and refused to publish 
her translation, although she discreetly had copies made (24, 25; see also Butterfield’s chapter for 
suggestions on Hutchinson’s motivations, e.g. Evelyn’s aborted publication: Butterfield, 62).8 
Indeed, all early modern English translators of DRN omitted or euphemized the portions dealing 
with sexual desire (as ‘fit for a midwife’, pace Lucy Hutchinson), until Dryden’s version (Poole, 
191-192); Marolles’s French translation is less dainty than Evelyn or Creech’s (Cottegnies, 176). 
Marolles' translation was considered to be lacking in grace by some observers of the period yet… 
even Molière allegedly admired Marolles’s translation so much that he started a verse adaptation, 
early in the 1650s (171); no manuscript of this has been found but several contemporaries, including 
Marolles himself, refer to Molière’s version, and as Cottegnies notes, the dramatist does include 
obvious references to DRN in “Le Misanthrope.” Evelyn’s commentary on the DRN is an 
                                                          
7
 Ad Lucilium Epistulae Morales 72.9, cit. Hardy, 207. 
8
 Her translation has now been published: The Works of Lucy Hutchinson, 2 vols: I. The Translation of Lucretius, eds. 
R. Barbour and D. Norbrook; Latin text by M. C. Zerbino (Oxford, 2012). 
impressive line-by-line explanation and refutation of book 1, which owes much to Gassendi and 
Charleton’s adaptation of the latter. Evelyn compares Lucretius’s positions with those of ‘a whole 
array of thinkers from the Church Fathers to modern philosophers such as Gassendi and Charleton, 
but also Descartes and Digby’ (Cottegnies, 180). The result, Cottegnies emphasizes, is almost 
schizophrenic, however; ‘Evelyn offers here a vivid testimony of the conflicted reception of 
Lucretius in those years’, aiming to dissociate himself from ‘”the empty and impatient Epicures of 
our age”’ (cit. 180); the stupid fans, as it were. Yet ‘even in Evelyn’s pious, often extremely 
moralizing, commentary his discomfort surfaces, especially in the instances where he seems, almost 
in spite of himself, to sympathize with his author on a number of points’ (ibid.), as in the case of the 
infinity of worlds. Similarly, Hutchinson prefaced her manuscript translation with a dedicatory 
address in which she repents of the work as one of ‘youthful curiositie’ that expounded ‘such vaine 
Philosophy’ of ‘this dog’ (Butterfield, 62). 
I turn now to specific chapters, before briefly concluding. 
Harrison’s chapter is an exception in that it does not deal with the early modern period, but rather 
with the problem of DRN as a Roman reception of Greek philosophical elements. He provides an 
impressive close reading of sections of the first proem of DRN (1.1–148), emphasising how 
Lucretius, by presenting Epicurean doctrines in a 1
st
-century BCE Roman context, ‘negotiates some 
fundamental tensions between that radical Greek philosophy and traditional Roman culture’ (29), 
by appropriating and undermining key Roman concepts and institutions such as war, imperialism, 
and certain kinds of religious practice. The first proem is rich with allusions to war and disorder, 
and makes, Harrison suggests, a kind of ‘countercultural’ move in relation to dominant, patriotic 
Roman culture, by promoting peace against war. That is, DRN ‘uses superficially conventional 
Roman elements to argue for an Epicurean philosophy which is fundamentally subversive in Roman 
terms, and which presents contemporary Roman readers with deeply countercultural ideas’ (42). 
Butterfield gives a rich paleographic account of the manuscripts and private editions of DRN in 
early modern Europe (including an anonymous, still-unattributed ms. translation done in the late 
seventeenth century, now in the Bodleian Library). We learn a great deal about the Ur-manuscript 
that has survived since the 9
th
 century (at Leiden since the 17
th
 century); ironically, given the 
‘necessarily unfavourable environment towards Lucretius and Epicureanism through the Middle 
Ages’ (49), it survived only through transcriptions in Christian monasteries (46), including at the 
court of Charlemagne. It was a copy of this manuscript which Poggio Bracciolini discovered in 
1417, while acting as papal secretary for the Council of Konstanz (1414–1418). It is surprising, 
Butterfield emphasizes, that ‘the DRN avoided irrevocable loss and joining the miserable catalogue 
of classical works known only by their titles and the occasional quotation’ (49). Out of the welter of 
minor and major editions, commentaries and such, two stand out: Denys Lambin’s commentary 
(published in Paris, 1563-1564) and Thomas Creech’s edition and translation (1682 for the 
translation and 1685 for the Latin edition, at Oxford). With these, Lucretius, ‘although battered and 
bruised from his turbulent transmission, was at last ready to be read more carefully and more 
attentively than at any point since antiquity itself’ (68). 
Butterfield notes Lambin’s effort to refute the claim that the ‘undoubtedly impious writings of 
Epicurus and Lucretius could actually render their readers impious too’ (57); after all, the Church 
Fathers read pagan poetry … Conversely, Creech maintained that his textual efforts with Lucretius 
were to be understood as critical, in the strongest sense: ‘“I have heard that the best Method to 
overthrow the Epicurean Hypothesis (I mean as it stands opposite to Religion) is to expose a full 
system of it to publick view”’ (cit. Butterfield, 64); but – schizophrenically or at least 
polyphonically – in a later, Latin edition of DRN he produced, Creech drops the attacks on 
Lucretius almost completely and presents himself as a continuator of Gassendi. 
Brown studies the influence of the DRN on Machiavelli, who does not cite the text directly but 
made a transcription of DRN, now in the Vatican Library: ‘By the middle of the fifteenth century, 
Lucretius’s De rerum natura and Diogenes Laertius’s newly translated Life of Epicurus were 
circulating in Florence and they both encouraged new, transgressive thinking there, especially by 
Machiavelli’ (69). Specifically, Brown discusses how Lucretius’ ‘primitivism’, but also his 
atomistic cosmology, influenced Machiavelli, who, just like Lucretius, has a peculiar combination 
of freedom and determinism. In addition to other shared elements such as the critique of ambition 
(79) or the rejection of a strong boundary between humans and animals (82f.), the two thinkers 
share this idiosyncratic, ‘special’ determinism (70), particularly visible in Machiavelli’s 
contributions to Guicciardini’s ‘draft dialogue’ on free will, Del Libero Arbitrio del Huomo (82); 
the leitmotif here is the idea that the world has always been the same, including the behaviour and 
constitutions of human beings (71-72). Ultimately, ‘in insisting on the freedom of all living 
creatures to act independently, despite the constraints of necessity and chance, Machiavelli was 
adopting the Epicurean balance of forces that ran counter to Christian providentialism and 
Aristotelian teleology’ (86). Brown also notes in closing the influence of Lucretius on Hobbes (88). 
Haskell discusses Latin Lucretian poems published in 16
th
-century Italy (including Bruno), in a 
chapter rich with detail but difficult to summarize argumentatively. She notes that contrary to what 
we might expect, these poems are not necessarily 'vehicles for heresy' (92), nor do they form a 
coherent tradition, being instead quite miscellaneous: ‘The philosophical flights of the Cinquecento 
Lucretian poets range from cautious Christian raptures through to bold spiritual and cosmological 
thought experiments’ (119), the latter including Giordano Bruno. It is true that Bruno’s attraction to 
atomist ideas was raised at his trial for heresy, but not, so far as we know, his having imitated 
Lucretius in the Frankfurt poems (95).  
Davidson discusses the dissemination of manuscript copies of the DRN: Florence was known as the 
center (Poggio Bracciolini was a Tuscan), but there were copies in Rome, Naples, Venice, etc. As 
several contributors note, it was possible to read and study Lucretius without compromising 
Christian belief. Davidson explains that the ecclesiastical authorities—outside the jurisdiction of the 
Archbishop of Florence, at least – were not especially concerned by the circulation of DRN (128). 
The only reference to Lucretius in the archives of the Venetian Inquisition before 1600 was, 
Davidson stresses, in the trial of Bruno, where it was brought up, not by the tribunal, but by Bruno 
himself, who raised the question of the shared origin of humans and animals in order to attribute it 
to Lucretius and to reject it (130). In the Venetian Republic, there was no local equivalent of the 
Florentine decree of 1517 against its use in schools, and no campaign against those who owned or 
read manuscript or printed copies of the text (130). So the Church seemed not to be concerned about 
the religious implications of DRN. On the other hand, ecclesiastical tribunals in north-east Italy did 
prosecute individuals suspected of materialist beliefs about the creation of the world, divine 
providence, and the after-life. But at no point did clerical judges express any interest in the possible 
influence of Lucretius on these suspects; and in many cases, their opinions seem to have been 
prompted by other sources, or developed independently of written texts (132). 
Williams contributes a beautiful and powerful chapter (all contributions are elegantly written and 
impeccably edited, which bears mentioning…), on Montaigne’s typically complex, layered and 
concealed reading of DRN (his notes on his copy of the DRN are described here as distinguished 
into philological, literary-critical, thematic notes, and so on; his extensive cross-referencing and 
page number notation also served to compensate for the absence of an index in Lambin’s French 
edition). Clearly, DRN holds ‘a distinctive place in the Essais, with some 150 extracts, totalling 454 
lines quoted, and more than a sixth of the poem either directly cited or paraphrased’ (144). If 
Montaigne’s first reading of the poem in 1564 ‘seems to have been instrumental in his coming to 
terms with the premature death of his friend La Boétie, then the addition of close to a hundred new 
Lucretian passages in the later editions of the Essais bears witness to new and distinct lines of 
thinking’ (ibid.). In these later readings, Montaigne reconceives not only his relation to the DRN but 
his overall understanding of what it means to be an author. Williams is one of the contributors who 
most strongly rejects a distinction between sense and style, content and form. While the bulk of 
Montaigne’s citations of DRN are in the 'Apologie de Raimond Sebond' (76 quotations in all), in 
the essay on Virgil, Lucretius is somehow the hidden topic (here, quotations from DRN are longer 
than any quotations from Virgil). Montaigne’s reading of Lucretius is one of those cases where one 
is obliged to suspend the usual restrictions against ‘Straussianism’ as a method. After all, in the 
essay ‘Des livres’ Montaigne says, as Williams notes, that he deliberately avoids naming his Latin 
interlocutors, so that we listen more carefully to what they have to say (and not who they are). 
When Montaigne finally starts to annotate Lucretius in French, he uses what Williams calls a 
‘recurrent tag line’: ‘contre la religion’ (149). 
Cottegnies’s chapter examines the context of the English reception of Lucretius, with an eye to 
Marolles’s possible influence on Evelyn and his contemporaries. This reception significantly 
involves the milieu of English exiles in Paris, which included intellectuals such as Walter Charleton 
and Kenelm Digby, among others, and points to hitherto overlooked links between France and 
England (162). Thus Charleton, for one, wrote a philosophical dialogue entitled The Immortality of 
the Human Soul, Demonstrated by the Light of Nature (1657), which includes a character called 
Lucretius who … defends the immortality of the soul. Cottegnies observes that ‘This very 
convoluted piece of propaganda seems to me to reflect Charleton’s uneasy reception of Evelyn’s 
schizophrenic edition of book 1 of DRN, with its Janus-like paratexts, the epideictic preface and the 
damning commentary’ (188). Similarly, Evelyn thought he had to add a refutation to his translation 
‘as a means of toning down what can be described as his initial enthusiasm for Lucretius’ 
(Cottegnies, 186). In the end, though, even if Marolles had ‘blazed a trail, by treating Lucretius as 
just another classical author worth reading and treating with respect’, his influence was ultimately 
limited in England by the ‘peculiar anti-Hobbesian climate of the 1660s’: at which point, ‘this 
Epicurean moment was over’ (189). Contrary to previous scholars, Cottegnies detects a real 
influence of Marolles’ translation on Evelyn’s (182). She finds that Marolles is less timid in 
addressing literal meanings of philosophical or religious content, and to some extent also sexual 
implications; Evelyn ‘tried to mitigate the forceful explicitness of some of the most heterodox 
arguments by toning the text down’ (186).  
Poole discusses the impact of DRN as a ‘theory of human origins’ – evolutionary or not? He notes 
that Charleton left out book V of DRN (on ‘evolution’) from his study on Lucretius, as did many 
translators (194). For instance, Thomas Creech, the only early modern English translator of 
Lucretius to publish a complete version – in ‘rhyming heroic couplets’ no less (Butterfield, 64), 
‘defensively sneered in his notes about “men springing out of the Earth, as from the teeth of 
Cadmus his Dragon”’ (cit. Poole, 195), although Creech owned a copy of La Peyrère’s polygenecist 
treatise Prae-Adamitae. Poole emphasizes how La Peyrère’s ideas, and Epicuro-Lucretian theories 
of human origins and the ‘Mother Earth’, impacted otherwise hostile authors, such as Milton. 
Hardy is the one contributor who speaks out most clearly against the fashionable ‘swerve’ readings 
of DRN: ‘“Order” and “reason” are not the dominant buzzwords in recent studies of the reception of 
the De rerum natura. Flux, contingency, instability, and materialism tend to have the upper hand’ 
(201).
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 In contrast, he notes, all three early modern English translators of DRN (Creech, 
Hutchinson, and Evelyn) ‘share an interest in the poem’s vision of nature’s law-like regularity and 
intelligibility’ (201). And Hardy finds this to be an approach to DRN worth pursuing, in this case 
reading it as a work of natural theology, reflecting continuities he sees between DRN and ‘non-
Epicurean traditions of writing about nature’ (202), and dwelling on the admittedly challenging 
interpretation history of the foedera naturae (203-204). On his reading, the operations of nature as 
described in the DRN ‘make very little room for contingency’ (204), even if ultimately he seems to 
admit it is a ‘natural theology manqué[e]’ (220). Of course one can take Hardy’s philosophical 
presuppositions with a grain of salt, as when he states that ‘Lucretius’s account of the relationship 
between human reason, natural phenomena, and atoms is one of comforting synergy rather than 
alienating materialism’ (205 – using a rather unargued-for definition of materialism), but he notes a 
similar prejudice (in this case scholars taking anti-Lucretian reactions at face value) with the image 
of the universe as a jumble of letters (208). Hardy also emphasizes how early modern translators 
found it congenial to read Lucretius’ cosmos in a more Ciceronian, law-bound and intelligible 
fashion (213), with a fascinating discussion of the rendering of the foedera naturae as leges 
naturales (214). Another dimension of this reading of Lucretius, in England, was that natural 
theology ‘eventually came to provide an explicit, public justification for the study of nature as an 
enterprise outside the universities, and Epicureanism played a part in this process’ (217). 
Norbrook seeks to present revolutionary England as not just a ‘Machiavellian moment’, in Pocock’s 
celebrated phrase, but perhaps also an Epicurean moment. He begins by observing the apparently 
anomalous fact that Lucy Hutchinson, who composed the first complete translation of DRN in the 
revolutionary period, was also noted as the biographer of her husband, Colonel John Hutchinson 
(223). Indeed, the reception of Lucretius in mid-seventeenth century English political and religious 
thought ‘indicates a very complex dialectic in which within a strongly religious framework the most 
radically secular narrative of human history in existence could play a key role in political debates’ 
(223-224). Being primarily a historian of philosophy, I was intrigued to learn that the ‘paradigms’ 
for this reception of Lucretius were derived especially from Gassendi and Hobbes’, although they 
offered very different constructions of Lucretius to readers (225-226): ‘Broadly speaking, 
Gassendian readings were more faithful to the content of Lucretius’ thought, but Hobbesian 
readings might pick up provocations in tone that could go with a harder-edged interpretation’ (228). 
Further, Gassendian readings of Lucretius could be appealing as they linked him to political 
moderation and free will, while Hobbesian readings could appeal in the direction of intellectual 
radicalism (226). As a side note, we also learn that the classically Epicurean insistence on ‘an 
underlying sense of kinship with all creatures’ became an influence on the growing interest in 
vegetarianism in the period (229). 
Wilson discusses the presence of Epicureanism in early modern political philosophy, in contrast to 
the more obvious presence of Stoicism. She finds three elements of the Epicurean heritage to be 
‘central to post-Machiavellian political theory’: the thesis of the ‘mind-dependence or 
“conventional” nature of values and political status’; second, the thesis that the justice of a law 
‘depends on its utility in the circumstances of its application and that laws are legitimized by 
agreement or contract’; and finally, the notion that ‘the history of humanity consists of a succession 
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of stages, driven by technological and social innovation, that implies either continuing progress or 
degeneration, or both’ (259). Wilson notes that authors such as Grotius, despite their professed anti-
Epicureanism, made considerable use of the account of human cultural evolution in Book V of 
DRN. Atomistic ontology disturbs social order by showing social, moral, political entities to be 
‘fictions’ dependent on human desire, interests and projections – a doctrine with real resonance to 
Locke and Pufendorf’s thought (264). Epicureanism could also be further radicalised, as it was in 
Hobbes (270). She also reflects on the influence of DRN on Rousseau (276-277), presenting a 
useful overlap with Norbrook’s chapter (for instance on the possible status of a social contract idea 
in Lucretius, 229n. 17).
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Lucretius and the Early Modern is an excellent volume, with uniformly good contributions, clearly 
and elegantly written, as I’ve noted. One striking motif that emerges is how intellectually fruitful 
the ‘schizophrenic’ attempts at omissions and critiques of Lucretius could be in the successive 
translations of and commentaries on DRN (the term ‘schizophrenia’ is used explicitly in Cottegnies’ 
chapter). Further, Lucretian reception history is also a history of annotation and marginalia 
(Williams, 138; he discusses how important the discovery was of Montaigne's copy of DRN at a 
book auction in 1989), and of the materiality of manuscripts (Butterfield). Another, almost as 
schizophrenic but perhaps better-known, is that even when Lucretius was named as the target of 
critiques, the theoretical content often matched ancient atomism instead. In addition, in a situation 
familiar to students of ‘Spinozism’, ‘atheism’ and ‘materialism’ (the single quotes designating here 
the sense in which these were often constructs), critical portrayals of the DRN’s doctrines, as in 
Cicero, often served as a basis for the formation of interpretations of that work. Specialists of early 
modern Europe, historians of philosophy, hellénisants, paleographers and others have much to learn 
from this volume. 
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